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Abstract
The social dimensions of economic integration have become an increasingly significant feature of trade agreements, par-
ticularly those between developing countries. In the Brazilian case trade-related labour standards have not become a
major feature outside of the regional organization Mercosur (Common Market of the South), yet we know relatively lit-
tle about the reasons for this discrepancy. Paradoxically one of themain stakeholders in this debate, Brazilian trade unions,
has broadly supported social and labour clauses in the regional context but union activists have opposed labour provisions
in trade negotiations between asymmetric partners. A comparative analysis of the labour campaigns in Mercosur and the
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations explains this ambiguity in terms of Brazilian labour strategies towards
free trade negotiations and explores their implications for evaluations of labour attitudes to trade-related labour standards
in developing countries. The labour movement’s own conflicting perspectives on the trade–labour connection are a key
explanation of these outcomes, reinforcing the need for a greater appreciation of the complexity of trade union views in
the debate on labour standards.
Keywords
Brazil; Free Trade Area of the Americas; FTAA; globalization; international labour standards; labour unions; Latin America;
Mercosur; regional integration; trade
Issue
This article is part of the issue “Labour Standards in a Global Environment”, edited by Gerda Van Roozendaal (University of
Groningen, The Netherlands) and Jan Orbie (Ghent University, Belgium).
© 2017 by the author; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribu-
tion 4.0 International License (CC BY).
1. Introduction
Brazilian trade unions have viewed free trade agree-
ments and trade-related labour standards with consid-
erable suspicion based on what they perceive as the
predominantly negative effects of free trade on jobs
and working conditions. Their objections refer both to
the perceived negative impact of trade liberalization
on developing countries such as Brazil as well as suspi-
cions aboutmaking free trade conditional on compliance
with international labour standards. These criticisms do
not imply that Brazilian unionists object to international
labour standards; on the contrary, they have actively in-
corporated the international labour standards agenda in
domestic campaigns since the late 1970s. However, their
argument is that labour clauses in trade agreements can
amount to veiled protectionism if they involve economic
sanctions in the case of labour rights violations. In the
eyes of many trade unionists in developing countries,
such efforts can lead to job losses instead of an improve-
ment of workers’ rights. Despite these criticisms, union-
ists have in fact engaged with the debate about trade
and labour standards in the context of free trade nego-
tiations and regional integration since the early 1990s.
Faced with the reality of trade agreements, unionists
have participated in these negotiations so as to have a
voice in what they have come to view as an inevitable
process. Yet the dilemma of whether to participate in the
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debate and the institutions associated with trade agree-
ments, or to mobilize against them, is evident in their
strategies and stance towards the negotiation process
and its aftermath.
To explain how this dilemma affects labour strate-
gies towards free trade agreements in developing coun-
tries, the article examines two case studies of labour en-
gagement in trade negotiations in the Americas, namely
Mercosur (CommonMarket of the South)1 and the FTAA
(Free Trade Area of the Americas). In the case of Mer-
cosur, the Brazilian labour movement actively partici-
pated in institutional structures focused on the labour
and social dimensions of the integration process since
the early 1990s. In the case of the FTAA, Brazilian unions
rejected the agreement, including the prospect of labour
and environmental clauses. A comparative analysis of
trade union strategies concerning two of Brazil’s most
important trade agreements between 1990 and 2005 ex-
plains why the trade union perspective on free trade has
varied so significantly between Mercosur and the FTAA,
which has subsequently also shaped the actual impact
of labour standards in trade agreements in Brazil. In the
case of Mercosur, while labour standards are part of the
organization’s institutional framework, they are neither
binding—as trade unions had initially proposed—nor
linked to trade. Nevertheless,Mercosur has facilitated re-
gional collaboration among trade unionists, whose lobby-
ing resulted in a declaration on social and labour rights.
Although the FTAA never materialized the negotiations
unified and solidified labour and civil society opposition
to free trade, including trade-related labour standards,
which continues to resonate in the region today.
The central argument is that the extent to which
labour standards were included in these trade negoti-
ations cannot be understood without reference to the
complexity of trade union perspectives on trade-related
labour standards. Although the social and labour out-
comes of free trade agreements depend on a wide va-
riety of factors, including government and business atti-
tudes as well as the dynamics of regional trade negotia-
tions in different parts of the world, trade union voices in
developing countries should be considered a significant
part of the story. These perspectives have also shaped
how trade unionists dealt with the dilemma of engage-
ment with, or opposition to, trade agreements, which
have played out in different ways during the Mercosur
and FTAAnegotiations, underlining the significance of do-
mestic agency in shaping the outcomes of the debate on
the trade–labour linkage. The article shows that labour
opposition to trade-related labour standards is not nec-
essarily the norm in a developing country like Brazil
since union strategies are shaped instead by perceptions
of how engagement with free trade negotiations might
harm or benefit the promotion of workers’ interests. The
comparative case studies also show that even though
the outcomes of trade negotiations involving Brazil have
remained limited in terms of labour clauses, the partic-
ipatory structures in the case of Mercosur and civil so-
ciety opposition to the FTAA created spaces for regional
trade union collaboration. Despite the fact that the FTAA
was never implemented, the negotiation process never-
theless had an impact on civil society debates on the
social dimensions of free trade, solidifying the opposi-
tion to North–South trade agreements in much of Latin
America. These outcomes reflect both the geopolitical
characteristics of Mercosur and the FTAA, and the pro-
found scepticism about trade-related labour standards
commonly found in South America among trade union
actors. Before examining Brazilian labour engagement
with trade agreements in further detail, the article dis-
cusses how we can understand union perspectives on
trade-related labour standards, emphasizing that these
views are more complex than often suggested in the
literature. Subsequently, it is necessary to turn to the
Brazilian context to explain how ideas about the im-
pact of globalization, free trade and development have
informed Brazilian trade union strategies towards free
trade agreements, followed by a comparison of labour
campaigns in the cases of Mercosur and the FTAA.
2. Understanding Labour Movement Perspectives on
Free Trade and Labour Standards.
Provisions to promote labour standards can be found in
all South-South trade agreements, including in regional
organizations in the Americas (International Labour Or-
ganization [ILO], 2015, p. 67). The underlying assump-
tion of connecting trade to working conditions is that
market access can be made conditional upon develop-
ing countries’ compliance with the international labour
standards agenda. Due to their “soft law” nature—the
lack of regulation and sanctions attached to labour rights
violations—international labour standards are notori-
ously hard to enforce (Pahle, 2014a, pp. 130–131), so
the rationale for trade-related labour standards is that
countries have to introduce labour reforms and continue
to monitor progress to qualify for a trade agreement
(ILO, 2015, p. 30). A more common practice is to incorpo-
rate positive incentives to respect labour rights, including
mechanisms to improve working conditions by fostering
cooperation between unions, monitoring of labour con-
ditions, and in some cases complaint mechanisms (ILO,
2015, pp. 70–71). However, despite their growing im-
portance in bilateral and multilateral trade agreements
trade-related labour standards have had a limited impact
in Brazil. In the most important trade negotiations for
Brazil since the early 1990s, labour provisions either did
not materialize or have been relatively limited. In the
case of Mercosur, debates about the social dimensions
of regional integration resulted in a declaration on labour
rights and formal civil society consultation, while in the
case of the FTAA, the proposed labour and environmen-
1 Because the Spanish acronym for the Mercado Común del Sur is more widely used than the Portuguese Mercosul, I will use Mercosur throughout
the article.
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tal clauses were abandoned amidst widespread opposi-
tion to free trade. The outcomes of both cases should
of course not be reduced to labour campaigns (Arashiro,
2011; Phillips, 2004) but an analysis of the trade union
perspective illustrates the complex nature of the trade–
labour debate in a Latin American context. In particular,
trade union perceptions of the geopolitical differences
between both trade agreements shaped the unions’ am-
biguous approach to labour standards, despite the exis-
tence of limited participatory structures for labour and
civil society actors in both cases. To understand the rea-
sons for these differing outcomes it is necessary to ex-
plore the debate about the advantages and disadvan-
tages of labour provisions from the perspective of the
labour movement.
A significant part of the explanation for the ambigu-
ity in Brazilian trade union support for labour clauses can
be found in ideas among Brazilian union activists about
globalization, free trade and social conditions and how
these have informed their strategies to influence trade
negotiations. Analyses of trade–labour debate in devel-
oping countries are often based on the assumption that
workers in countries such as Brazil oppose labour stan-
dards in trade agreements primarily due to wariness of
unfair competition and protectionism (Bieler, Hilary, &
Lindberg, 2014, p. 6; González Garibay, 2009). The idea
that labour standards can be protectionist is based on
the view that developing countries have a comparative
advantage in lower labour costs and levels of regulation
than developed countries. From this perspective, if devel-
oping countries are forced to match international labour
standards workers can face negative outcomes if com-
panies cut jobs or move to another part of the world
in search of lower labour costs. However, given the dif-
ferent outcomes of the Mercosur and FTAA negotiations
in terms of the trade–labour linkage, this assumption
only tells us part of the story and fails to explain why
trade unions approached both cases differently. As Grif-
fin, Nyland and O’Rourke (2002, pp. 4–7) argue, to un-
derstand these differences we need to take into account
that trade unionists in the developing world have not al-
ways rejected the trade–labour linkage, reflecting amore
complex set of considerations than often assumed. This
assumption also reflects a failure to take into account
how developing countries such as Brazil—and particu-
larly civil society and labour actors (Nadvi, 2014, p. 143)—
engage with trade-related labour standards. Moreover,
their position reflects what Orbie, Martens, Oehri and
Van den Putte (2016, p. 527) call the “insider–outsider
dilemma” of civil society engagement with free trade ne-
gotiations. Their study shows that in the case of the EU
civil society actors have chosen to take part in participa-
tory mechanisms so as not to lose a voice in the process,
while also being aware that their participation may help
legitimize free trade. The diversity of views about trade
and labour among unionists therefore suggests the need
to bring trade union views on, and strategies towards,
trade agreements into the analysis.
To achieve amore nuanced understanding of the rela-
tionship between trade and labour standards in develop-
ing countries requires taking into account the interaction
between labour politics, national political conjuncture,
and the nature of the trade negotiations themselves.
As recognized in the literature on the social dimensions
of trade agreements, the effectiveness of trade-related
labour standards depends on domestic political and le-
gal contexts (ILO, 2015, p. 5). Similarly, the extent to
which intensified trade deteriorates social and environ-
mental conditions, and whether these effects can bemit-
igated is closely associated with the domestic regulatory
context. To underline the importance of the domestic
context in the case of Brazil, violations of fundamental
labour rights have been particularly common in grow-
ing sectors of the economy, such as construction, export
agriculture, infrastructure and natural resources. These
violations have included forced labour, human traffick-
ing, informality, poor working conditions as well as viola-
tions of the right to unionization and collective bargain-
ing (International Trade Union Confederation, 2009). Not
all of these cases have involved export-oriented sectors,
whichmeans that these violations reflect structural prob-
lems in Brazilian society, including high levels of informal
labour associated with a lack of protection of workers’
rights. In assessing the effectiveness of labour rights pro-
tection, Pahle (2014b) also emphasizes the importance
of the domestic context, especially the structural and po-
litical conditions in which unions operate, including the
relationship between labour’s national and international
agendas (Dobrusin, 2015, p. 280). Reflecting the growing
attention to the role of political ideas in analyses of re-
gional free trade debates (Arashiro, 2011; Nelson, 2015;
Phillips, 2004), another layer of my analysis of the ambi-
guities in labour strategies therefore refers to the Brazil-
ian union movement’s own conflicting views on interna-
tional labour standards, globalization and free trade.
3. Labour Movement Debates on the Trade–Labour
Linkage: Global and Regional Dimensions
Brazilian trade unionists’ perceptions of free trade re-
veal a paradox in how they understand the relevance
of trade-related labour standards, which has informed
labour strategies both in the case of Mercosur and the
FTAA. As expressed in numerous union documents and
in interviews I have conducted, Brazilian unionists have
focused their diagnosis of labour market problems on
the structural inequalities associated with the way capi-
talism operates in Brazil, a dynamic compounded by the
country’s asymmetrical relationship with the global econ-
omy. In their view, due to the unequal position of Brazil-
ian workers within their own country and the globalized
economy, the expansion of free trade could only lead to
the deepening of these inequalities and the weakening
of unions, meaning that trade agreements should be re-
jected altogether. From the union movement’s perspec-
tive, trade-related labour standards could not address
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these structural inequalities because they have viewed
free trade as perpetuating developing countries’ unequal
position in the world economy. In turn, Brazilian unions’
views on labour rights, globalization, development and
trade have shaped their perceptions of how trade and
labour provisions affect working conditions in developing
countries. Thus, in their view Mercosur and the FTAA re-
flected different manifestations of globalization and free
trade, with a differential impact onworkers. The following
discussion is based on an analysis of the debates within
Brazil’s largest national trade union organization, the Cen-
tral Única dos Trabalhadores (Unified Workers’ Central—
or CUT). In 2016, the CUT’s membership represented 3.8
million, or approximately one-third of Brazil’s unionized
workers across the industrial, public and rural sectors
(Confederação Nacional de Profissionais Liberais, 2016).
Even before Brazil’s trade balance tipped towards ex-
ports of natural resources and agricultural products in
the early 2000s, unionists reached for the classic depen-
dency explanation that expanding agricultural and min-
eral exports would make the Brazilian economy espe-
cially vulnerable to the volatility of international markets
(CUT, 1994, p. 7). Not only would an export-focused de-
velopment strategy promote products with low added
value (such as agricultural goods), thereby creating poor
working conditions rather than high-quality and well-
paid jobs, the opening up of Brazil’s markets would have
immediate and negative consequences for workers due
to global competition, leading to reduced wages and the
erosion of labour rights (CUT, 1997, p. 7). From this per-
spective, the expansion of free trade as part of the glob-
alization process would inevitably deepen social exclu-
sion. According to the CUT’s former president, Vicente
Paulo da Silva (1994–1996), “workers from all over the
world are under pressure to abandon their rights and le-
gitimate demands in the name of international compe-
tition. At the same time, unemployment increases, and
we see an enormous concentration of power andwealth”
(Silva, n.d.).2 In the CUT’s analysis of globalization’s im-
pact on Brazil during the 1990s, multinational corpora-
tions and international financial institutions were the
driving forces behind economic integration, underlining
the point that trade was only part of the story, while
their experience with multinationals showed that com-
pany strategies were focused on driving downwages and
working conditions in their search for profits. This in-
terpretation of globalization and its impact on Brazilian
workersmeant that union representatives have generally
believed that trade agreements would deepen the coun-
try’s social problems, which could not be remedied by a
given social clause.
These considerations do not imply that the CUT has
opposed all regional and global trade agreements, as
they have recognized the potential for civil society to con-
tribute to sustainable global and regional economic in-
tegration (Castro, 1999, p. 12). This distinction became
particularly apparent in civil society attitudes to Merco-
sur in the 1990s and the FTAA from the late 1990s to
the mid-2000s. While unionists viewed Mercosur as an
organization with the potential to withstand the pres-
sures of globalization, they saw the FTAA as dictated by
the US in an attempt to expand its economic interests
in the Americas, with Latin American workers exclusively
bearing the negative consequences. Based on the labour
movement’s evaluation of free trade and Mexico’s expe-
riences with the North-American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), union activists in the industrial sector expected
regional integration between asymmetrical partners to
lead to the downward harmonization of social and labour
rights (author’s interviews with Maria S. Portela de Cas-
tro, adviser ConfederaçãoNacional dosMetalúrgicos, Oc-
tober and December 1999; Castro, 1999, p. 13). Their
knowledge ofMexican and trade union experiences with
NAFTA also underlined for Brazilian unionists and their
Latin American counterparts their lack of a voice in what
they saw as FTAA’s singular focus on trade liberaliza-
tion and economic deregulation. In the case of Merco-
sur, unions ended up participating in the formal institu-
tions of the regional organization, while in the case of
the FTAA there was a successful campaign to derail hemi-
spheric trade negotiations. What these differences tell
us about Brazilian union attitudes to trade-related labour
standards is that their perceptions of the geopolitical na-
ture of the respective negotiations—one between devel-
oping countries and the other dominated by the US—
were a key factor in the unions’ willingness to engage
with labour provisions.
3.1. Mercosur: Regional Integration as a Platform for
Labour Campaigns
As the main regional platform for debates on the so-
cial and labour dimensions of regional integration in
Latin America, Mercosur became a significant focus for
transnational union action in the 1990s. Mercosur also
represents the clearest example in South America of a
regional trade agreement’s impact on domestic labour
standards, particularly the creation of spaces for in-
creased dialogue, cooperation and formal participation
in Mercosur-supported institutions involving union and
other civil society actors in the member states. This begs
the question why labour actors decided to use Merco-
sur’s negotiation process and formal institutions as an
opportunity to draw attention to the social dimensions
of economic integration, despite the Brazilian unionists’
pessimistic views of trade agreements. To answer this, it
is necessary to analyse how trade unionists viewed Mer-
cosur in the context of the worsening recession of the
1990s, the impact of Mercosur’s labour provisions and
the creation of spaces for transnational union action as-
sociated with the Mercosur process.
Mercosur emerged at a time when Brazil was experi-
encing hyperinflation rates reaching four digits in 1993.
Successive governments introduced neoliberal reforms
2 All translations from Portuguese are by the author.
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such as privatization, budget cuts and trade liberaliza-
tion to stabilize the economy. Part of this strategy to
liberalize the economy was to create a regional com-
mon market on a regional scale before exposing Brazil
to global competition (Phillips, 2004, p. 85). The labour
movement experienced significant challenges during this
period as the crisis led to job losses and unions increas-
ingly struggled to develop an effective response (Riethof,
in press, Chapter 4). Based on their experience of how
labour issues were dealt with in NAFTA Brazilian union-
ists understood that a trade agreement between asym-
metric partners could be detrimental to Latin American
workers. They also understood the rationale for a Latin
American trading bloc, which would allow governments
to liberalize the economy in stages and to counter pro-
tectionism in developed countries by increasing trade
with neighbouring countries (CUT, 2003, pp. 39–40). As
Kjeld Jakobsen, CUTdirector of international relations be-
tween 1994 and 2003, explained:
The CUT’s priority vis-à-vis Mercosur is to ensure that
it does not just turn into a trade agreement that only
benefits large corporations, but that it becomes an
agreement for “mutual integration”. In other words, if
Brazil sells something to Argentina that we have and
they don’t, and vice versa, we can increase produc-
tion, createmore jobs. (as cited in Barbiero&Chaloult,
2000, p. 65)
Thus despite their misgivings about the benefits of free
trade for workers in developing countries, union activists
viewed a Latin American trading bloc as having the poten-
tial to mediate the negative effects of globalization (CUT,
2003, p. 66; Phillips, 2004, p. 170), particularly if civil soci-
ety activists managed to put pressure on their country’s
political leadership to create the necessary political will
to do so. In effect, for unionists the geopolitical nature of
Mercosur as a South-South agreement meant that fears
that labour standards would lead to protectionism were
less acute.3
Trade unionists also saw potential in Mercosur facili-
tating civil society participation in economic policy, in con-
trast to the government-dominated economic liberaliza-
tion policies which were common in the 1990s. Merco-
sur created spaces for cross-border labour action as a re-
gional “labour politics…emerged parallel to these region-
alist negotiations and in important respects has acted
to offset the ongoing marginalisation of labour” (Phillips,
2004, p. 170). Regional union activism focused on coor-
dinating the union position vis-à-vis Mercosur’s agenda
and strengthening its social dimensions. Consequently, a
major focus of union activism was to lobby for the demo-
cratic participation of civil society in the regional integra-
tion process (CUT, 1994, p. 6). The main union organiza-
tion involved in this processwas the Coordinadora de Cen-
trales Sindicales del Cono Sur (Co-ordinationofUnionCen-
trals in the Cono Sur, or CCSCS), founded in 1986 (Castro,
2007; CUT, 2003, p. 17). Several institutional structures
dealing with social issues were the result of union lob-
bying (Dabène, 2009, p. 164; Godio, 2004, pp. 101–102),
which included a working group and consultative forum
focused on labour issues, a declaration of labour and so-
cial rights, and a regional commission tomonitor the state
of labour rights in Mercosur member states.
Although Mercosur’s Treaty of Asunción (1991) fo-
cused primarily on economic and trade issues, it also es-
tablished a tripartite working group dealing with labour
and employment issues (SGT11, later SGT10) in 1991
and the Socio-Economic Consultative Forum (FCES) in
1994 (Castro, 1999, pp. 46–49). Within these structures,
union strategies emphasized the inclusion of the ILO
core labour standards in the regional integration pro-
cess. As a CUT document explained, “the international
labour norms as defined by the ILO were an impor-
tant…incentive for the creation and improvement of jobs
and to foster an equilibrium in trade relations” (CUT,
2003, p. 63). Based on this view, unions lobbied for the
adoption of a Mercosur Social Charter modelled on the
EU’s equivalent. The proposal specified a binding set of
individual and collective labour rights, such as freedom
of association, the right to strike and collective bargain-
ing. The unions also proposed a tripartite body in charge
ofmonitoring compliancewith regional labour norms, in-
cluding sanctions (CUT, 2003, pp. 68–69). Although such
a far-reaching charter failed to materialize, mainly due
to the proposed economic sanctions, Mercosur officially
adopted the Declaration of Social and Labour Rights in
1998 and established the Social-Labour Commission to
oversee social and labour rights in 1999. The Declara-
tion was updated in 2015 to include a stronger focus
on employment creation in times of crisis and the ILO’s
“decent work” agenda, following years of discussions
among labour, business and government participants
(CUT, 2015). As such, the Declaration moved beyond fun-
damental labour rights to include freedom ofmovement,
social security and employment policy (Schaeffer, 2007,
pp. 837–838). These examples show that despite the rel-
atively limited scope of labour provisions in Mercosur,
these outcomes are evidence of effective union engage-
ment with Mercosur’s participatory structures.
Unionists involved in the Mercosur process gener-
ally considered the Declaration a step forward for labour
rights, despite the lack of sanctions. Reflecting the limi-
tations of the original proposal, the CUT’s Ericson Crivelli
argued:
Weworkedwith the notion of sanctions, which would
mean the possibility of penalizing those who did not
3 Due to the size of its economy, its foreign policy ambitions and regional investments Brazil has dominated Mercosur since its inception, which means
that the relationship between the Mercosur member states is unequal. Zibechi (2014, loc. 132) argues that under the Workers’ Party governments
(2003–2016) trade unions such as the CUT, as close government allies, effectively became complicit in the Brazilian government’s strategy for regional
dominance. In the political context of the 1990s, though, Brazilian unions were not as closely connected to government strategies so their strategies
should not be equated to the government’s negotiating position in regional trade agreements.
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comply [with the proposed Charter]. But this is a false
idea because sanctions do not exist in international
[labour] law as they do in domestic law. (as cited in
Barbiero & Chaloult, 2003, p. 103)
Without powers to enforce the Declaration, the emerg-
ing regional labour rights framework has nevertheless
had an impact on labour politics in the Mercosur mem-
ber states. Unionists indicated that they appreciated the
FCES as a forum to voice civil society demands while sug-
gesting that they could send cases of labour rights vi-
olations to the Social-Labour Commission (Barbiero &
Chaloult, 2003, p. 105; CUT, 2003, p. 99). Furthermore,
Giuppone (2014, pp. 85–86) cites cases in Argentina and
Brazil where national courts invoked the Social-Labour
Declaration in labour conflicts, interpreting national law
in relation to international labour rights instruments,
including references to the right to decent work, job
security, the protection of informal workers and free-
dom of association. Mercosur provisions have also led
to joint labour inspections between Brazil, Argentina and
Paraguay investigating child labour in the border regions
(International Labour Office, 2009, pp. 444–445). These
examples indicate that while the Mercosur provisions
cannot guarantee compliance with labour rights, they
have had an impact on the domestic context, not least
as a reference point for labour campaigns.
Although transnational union strategies have been
developed predominantly at the level of national union
federations, Mercosur also facilitated cross-border col-
lective bargaining and labour campaigns in the 1990s.
The automobile sector is a rare example where regional
integration, and a degree of policy co-ordination be-
tween the governments of Argentina and Brazil, was wit-
nessed in the second half of the 1990s. The Brazilian
government introduced the New Automobile Regime in
1995 within the context of the Mercosur negotiations
(Gómez Mera, 2007), which included measures to pro-
mote exports, the use of national components, and state
support for company restructuring (Castro, 1999, pp.
27–28). In contrast to World Trade Organization rules
these policies represented a turn to state intervention
to support a strategic sector of the Brazilian economy.
This policy extended to the bilateral level, as the Argen-
tinean and Brazilian governments harmonized their re-
spective automobile sector policies within theMercosur
framework. Moreover, in March 1999 a supranational
collective labour contract was agreed between Brazil-
ian and Argentinian metalworkers’ unions and Volkswa-
gen in Brazil and Argentina, with a view of establish-
ing Mercosur-level workers’ committees for multina-
tional enterprises operating across borders (Sindicato
dos Metalúrgicos do ABC, 1999). The agreement (full
text in Departamento Intersindical de Estatística e Es-
tudos Socio-Econômicos, 2000) specified the fundamen-
tal right to unionization, information exchange between
unions and management, and emphasized the impor-
tance of worker training programmes to cope with the
economic crisis. Such initiatives have evolved in the auto-
mobile sector, where Brazilian unions have traditionally
been strongest, but other examples of regional coordi-
nation emerged in the banking, transport, construction,
textile, paper, and graphic sectors in the 1990s (Castro,
1999, pp. 14–16).
Although Mercosur created spaces for regional coor-
dination of labour campaigns, social themes remained a
secondary concern compared to trade and economic de-
velopment (Dabène, 2009, p. 169; Godio, 2004, p. 23),
a dynamic reinforced by the intergovernmental nature
of decision-making (Doctor, 2013, pp. 529–530). Merco-
sur’s participatory structures were organized on a tripar-
tite basis but labour was of course not an equal part-
ner; as union activists recognized: “despite the tripar-
tite nature of SGT11, the decisions were made by gov-
ernments” (CUT/Confédération des Sindicats Nationaux,
1996, p. 32). For the Brazilian labour movement these
initiatives underlined the dual nature of the regional in-
tegration process, which reflected the insider–outsider
dilemmas for civil society engagement (CUT, 2003, pp.
39–40; Orbie et al., 2016). Even if they were narrow in
scope, Mercosur offered participatory structures but the
dominant economic focus also reminded unionists that
regional integration and trade liberalization without so-
cial safeguards could still weaken labour rights. Neverthe-
less, the nature of Mercosur as an agreement between
developing countries, together with opportunities to dis-
cuss social dimensions meant that Brazilian trade unions
decided to engage with rather than oppose regional in-
tegration, leading to several cross-border labour cam-
paigns and initiatives intended to promote labour stan-
dards at a regional level.
3.2. Labour Opposition to the FTAA
If Mercosur offered trade unions several advantages to
participate in debates about the social dimensions of re-
gional integration, the proposal for a hemispheric free
trade agreement became a focal point for civil society
and labour opposition throughout the region. First pro-
posed in 1994, the FTAA negotiations intensified towards
the end of the 1990s in the midst of widespread opposi-
tion among Latin American social movements (Arashiro,
2011, pp. 31–35). The FTAA came to symbolize labour
opposition to the growing dominance of neoliberal pol-
itics and the anticipated negative impact on jobs, wages
and labour rights. Brazilian labour opposition focused
not only on the negative effects of trade integration
but also acquired an explicitly political dimension as the
protestors merged their opposition to free trade with
a rejection of neoliberal policies such as privatization,
labour market flexibilization and economic liberalization.
As a CUT document summarized the FTAA’s wider polit-
ical relevance: “the FTAA turned into a symbol of glob-
alization and neoliberalism for the cutista labour move-
ment” (CUT, 2003, p. 82). These ideological perspectives
on globalization and free trade led to a symbolically pow-
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erful rejection of the FTAA, which left little space to
negotiate labour provisions. As a result, despite provi-
sions for civil society participation in the FTAA talks and
debates on the inclusion of labour standards, civil so-
ciety and labour actors comprehensively rejected the
free trade agreement, without contemplating the poten-
tial benefits of the trade–labour linkage. This standpoint
meant that Brazilian unions, together with many other
civil society actors in Latin America, resolved the par-
ticipation dilemma in favour of disengagement and op-
position. In this case, the perception that an asymmet-
rical trade agreement between developing and devel-
oped countrieswould inevitably damage jobs, wages and
working conditions in Latin America shaped the Brazilian
labour movement’s strategies vis-à-vis the FTAA. Despite
Latin American union support for a binding labour clause
in Mercosur, they rejected a similar proposal for hemi-
spheric free trade. To explain the rationale for this posi-
tion, labourmovement strategies need to be understood
in the context of the growing opposition to neoliberalism
and free trade in Latin America, symbolized in the view
of labour activists by the FTAA.
The initial proposals for the FTAA negotiations in-
cluded labour and environmental provisions, reflecting
the NAFTA experience and commitments by the Clin-
ton administration to social and political issues (Arashiro,
2011, pp. 33–34). However, most Latin American govern-
ments rejected the inclusion of labour and environmen-
tal clauses, arguing that such provisions would lead to
protectionism and should be overseen by the ILO instead.
This attitude to labour provisions did not just reflect a
principled position but also informed Brazilian negotiat-
ing strategies. A Brazilian trade unionist involved in FTAA
summits in the late 1990s explained to me that Brazilian
negotiators sometimes raised the spectre of labour stan-
dards in an attempt to stall the negotiations, reflecting
their awareness of the lack of support for labour clauses
within Latin America and domestic pressure in the US to
address social and environmental issues (author’s inter-
view with “Paulo”, December 1999). The CUT itself not
only rejected the inclusion of labour clauses in the FTAA
negotiations as a form of protectionism against workers
in developing countries, it argued that “there is no pos-
sibility whatsoever for progressive clauses in this treaty
or for it to guarantee even the bare minimum of labour
rights” (as cited in American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations, 2001, pp. 30–31).
As a result of this stalemate, the debate on labour and
environmental protection was removed from the negoti-
ations in 1998, and in the meantime trade unions were
merely invited to make their views known in the negoti-
ation process (Nelson, 2015, pp. 85–91). The unions’ de-
cision to oppose rather than engage with the FTAA pro-
cess solidified their rejection of this form of free trade,
despite the existence of participatory structures. In ad-
dition, although the original proposal included labour
and social clauses, they did not convince Latin American
unions to support the agreement.
The purpose of the union campaigns towards the
FTAA was not so much to push the negotiations to-
wards a more socially acceptable direction but to mobi-
lize a broad civil society network against the agreement
in all its aspects. With the actual negotiations about
trade and a potential labour clause taking place behind
closed doors (Dobrusin, 2015, p. 276), the FTAA’s insti-
tutional structure also included summit meetings, which
involved debates between government, business and
civil society actors (Nelson, 2015, pp. 81–82). Using the
summit structure to their advantage, social and labour
movements began to network to establish an alterna-
tive, “people-centred” debate on hemispheric integra-
tion, which proved to be critical to the mobilization of an
anti-free trade campaign. From 1997 onwards, the CUT
actively participated in alternative social summits to con-
test the FTAA, including key roles in the Hemispheric So-
cial Alliance against free trade and in the World Social
Forum as a platform for civil society actors to contest the
economic focus of global trade talks. The growing per-
ception in Latin American countries of the wider nega-
tive impact of the agreement on public services and local
communities helped broaden the anti-free trade coali-
tion, leading to popular referendums and mass protests
(Dobrusin, 2015, p. 278). This difference in strategy to-
wardsMercosur and the FTAA indicates that while labour
activists saw the former’s structures and social provisions
as potentially beneficial for labour rights, in the case of
the latter, cross-border labour and civil society coopera-
tion led to opposition, even if this strategy contributed
to labour provisions disappearing from the agenda.
The eventual failure of the FTAA in 2005 can be at-
tributed to a mixture of civil society opposition and the
changing ideological complexion of Latin American gov-
ernments around the turn of the century, underlining
not only geopolitical differences between the two cases
but also the changing regional political conjuncture. Un-
til 2003 the Brazilian government’s negotiating position
focused on ensuring that hemispheric trade liberaliza-
tion would not damage its fragile economy, arguing that
the country was not yet ready for full exposure to US
competition (Arashiro, 2011, pp. 123–126; Burges, 2009,
p. 40). The domestic protests against the trade agree-
ment bolstered Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da
Silva’s own scepticism about the benefits of free trade,
while growing opposition among Latin American govern-
ments meant that Brazilian representatives managed to
stall the negotiations by proposing two-track negotia-
tions, which resulted in the watering down of the agree-
ment and its permanent suspension in 2005. In conclu-
sion, in the case of the FTAA, labour activists rejected
the entire premise of the trade agreement, including the
prospect of a labour clause, because they believed that
the agreement would inevitably harm workers’ interests.
In contrast with Mercosur, its status as an agreement be-
tween highly asymmetrical countries was therefore an
important consideration for the FTAA’s opponents.While
labour activists campaigned for binding labour standards
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in Mercosur, they rejected this option in the case of the
FTAA due to their negative perceptions of the impact
a North–South trade agreement would have on Brazil-
ian workers.
4. Conclusion: The Prospects for Labour Standards in
the Americas
The failure of the FTAA in 2005 signalled the stagna-
tion of multilateral trade talks involving Brazil, includ-
ing those involving debates about labour standards. The
cases of labour engagement withMercosur and the FTAA
underline the crucial importance of taking into account
the political context in which trade negotiations take
place as well as the complexity of the labour move-
ment’s perspectives and strategies in shaping the out-
comes. The ambiguities evident in the Brazilian union
movement’s attitude towards free trade and labour pro-
visions shows assumptions about union strategies in de-
veloping countries should be nuanced, taking into ac-
count unionists’ ideas about free trade and labour as
well as their interpretation of the costs and benefits of
engagement with free trade negotiations. The implica-
tions of this article’s findings are not limited to the cases
of Mercosur and the FTAA but also inform debates and
research on the impact of and prospects for improved
labour standards in Latin America. The case of the FTAA
underlines how the political conjuncture in which the
trade talks took place shaped labour strategies towards
free trade agreements, as the political climate turned
increasingly hostile towards economic integration with
the US at the end of the 1990s. This scepticism also ex-
plains why, despite bilateral agreements between the
US and Latin American countries such as Chile, Colom-
bia, Panama and Peru involving labour provisions (ILO,
2015, pp. 33–41), these agreements have not been ex-
panded to other Latin American countries, such as Brazil.
With the exception of sectoral agreements such as Brazil–
US cooperation on biofuels, Brazil’s bilateral trade nego-
tiations have been conducted through Mercosur. Since
2000, Mercosur has negotiated a limited number of bi-
lateral agreements with other developing countries in
Latin America and the Middle East, none of which have
included labour provisions. For example, Mercosur’s bi-
lateral agreements with Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and
Peru have covered themes such as trade in goods and
services, investments, intellectual property and compe-
tition policy, but not the issue of labour rights (Sanchez
Badin, de Carvalho, & Ribeiro Roriz, 2014, pp. 66, 91–92).
The potential for an EU–Mercosur trade agreement to
address labour issues is also low due to the EU’s reluc-
tance to move beyond a “soft” rather than a conditional
approach to social and environmental standards (Adri-
aensen & González Garibay, 2013) and because inter-
regional negotiations stalled between 2004 and 2016.
As negotiations resumed in 2016 Mercosur trade unions
have called for civil society participation in the negotia-
tionswhile simultaneously remaining sceptical about the
benefits of free trade and the impact of an asymmetrical
agreement on workers, echoing their position towards
the FTAA (Exame, 2014; Jakobsen, 2015).
This article has analysed the variations in Brazilian
union strategies towards labour standards in regional
integration in the Americas, with a particular focus on
Mercosur and the FTAA. The comparative discussion of
the two case studies found that in the case of Mer-
cosur, Brazilian trade unionists were willing to partici-
pate actively in debates about the regional regulation of
labour standards, whereas in the case of FTAA, labour
opposition contributed to the failure of the negotiations.
The findings indicate that the decision to engage with
free trade negotiations cannot be reduced to the ex-
istence of participatory structures or the inclusion of
labour provisions in the negotiation process, which ex-
isted in both cases. The Brazilian labour movement’s ap-
proach to Mercosur and the FTAA indicate a complex
debate, involving the geopolitical aspects of the trade
agreements, the nature of civil society participation in
trade negotiations and the union movement’s own am-
bivalence about labour and trade. To understand the
reasons for these ambiguous perspectives we need to
take into account the complexity of labour movement
attitudes to trade-related labour standards, moving be-
yond the assumption that unionists in developing coun-
tries always reject them, in favour of examining the ideas
that inform labour strategies. In both cases, labour ac-
tivists were sceptical about the benefits of economic in-
tegration, particularly regional trade agreements with-
out social safeguards. What makes the case of Merco-
sur different from the FTAA was that the labour move-
ment’s perception of the latter was overwhelmingly neg-
ative due to the asymmetric nature of the agreement.
In particular, the idea that the FTAA implied a funda-
mentally unequal political and economic relationship be-
tween the US and Latin America sparked opposition and
a refusal among Latin American labour activists to en-
gage with its labour provisions. In the case of Merco-
sur, unionists were equally sceptical about free trade
but nevertheless saw potential for a Latin American trad-
ing bloc to improve social conditions as long as the in-
tegration process involved strong civil society participa-
tion. These differences bring us back to the dilemma
outlined at the start of this article: where trade-related
labour standards were concerned, labour movements
faced the dilemma whether to oppose the implementa-
tion of labour standards or use the opportunity to par-
ticipate in consultations and negotiations, even if they
are limited and narrow in scope. How labour activists
attempted to resolve this dilemma has shaped their
strategies towards trade agreements and ultimately in-
fluenced the outcomes of regional integration processes
in terms of labour standards.
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